The years-long debate by scholars about the decision-making process for the "Final Solution" has produced a
wide spectrum of interpretations and overviews. No direct evidence of the "order", written or unwritten, has
surfaced, or is likely to do so. The debate continues, because it is crucial for understanding the historiography
of the Nazi State. It could even be said that it will remain the "holy grail" of Holocaust research. Opinions
vary about the most probable time or period that the decision was taken, but most recent research indicates that
it was a gradual and complex process and that the crucial decisions were almost certainly taken in the
summer and autumn of 1941.
Christopher Browning, who for some years has been a leading researcher on this
subject, argues that it was a two-stage decision, one for Soviet and another for European Jewry, based on
the euphoria of assumed victory in
mid-July and early October 1941 respectively. If this
is so, it should be added that those decisions were also implemented in two main stages - firstly in
late 1941, to rid the
Reich of unproductive Jews (confirmed by the
Wannsee Conference, and secondly, in
July 1942,
being the period of accelerated deportations of all Jews under German occupation with the exception of Jews selected
for labour.
Peter Longerich suggests that the deportations from the
Reich in the
autumn and winter of 1941/42 precipitated the clearance of ghettos in the
Warthegau and the
Lublin area in order to
make room for the deportees (see below). It is proposed that the consequent commencement of mass gassings at
Chelmno and
Belzec were not "The Final Solution" in action as such, which was at
that stage still being contemplated by at least some of the Nazi hierarchy in a post-war "territorial" context, but
rather as specific operations to murder Polish Jews "unfit for work", albeit in the knowledge and with the consent of the
Himmler -
Heydrich Executive.
Longerich further proposes
that it was
Hitler's declaration of war on the United States
on
11 December 1941 that made the concept of using Western and Central European Jews
as hostages against American participation in the war obsolescent and ultimately was responsible in
part for the escalation to continent-wide genocide in the
spring and summer of 1942.
It had always
been the intention to eliminate the Eastern European Jews, either through labour, starvation, shooting
or finally by gassing. However, what had been initially conceived of as a post-war "solution" now
became a wartime imperative.
Bogdan Musial in his case study of Jewish persecution in the
Generalgouvernement 1939 - 44, concludes that the order was given in the first
half of
October 1941, based on the initiative of
Odilo Globocnik and connected with his orders to
Germanise first the
Lublin District, and then the entire
Generalgouvernement.
Dieter Pohl, Peter Witte and
Götz Aly,
among others, nominate
late August and early September 1941 for the initial
decision date. Certainly, there were a number of high-level communications as recorded in
Himmler’s diary for October -
Globocnik's name
appears in the diary on five occasions
between 9 and 25 October 1941.
Christian Gerlach is even more specific about the timing, suggesting that
Hitler took the fundamental decision at a meeting of
Reich and
Gau leaders in the Reich Chancellery on
12 December 1941.
Gerlach posits that the
Wannsee Conference, originally scheduled for
10 December 1941, was initially conceived
of as dealing solely with the question of the deportation of
Reich Jews.
By the time it was actually convened on
20 January 1942, the agenda had changed to
encompass the complete "Final Solution of the European Jewish Question". In his diary entry of
13 December 1941, the day after
Hitler’s private
speech,
Joseph Goebbels wrote:
"
In respect of the Jewish question, the Führer has decided to make a clean
sweep. The world war is here, the annihilation of the Jews must be the necessary result.”
It is credible to conclude that there were three steps in the evolution of total genocide: in-situ mass
killing operations post-Barbarossa (
June – December 1941); the first phase at
Belzec (
March - June 1942); and finally the
second phase at
Belzec,
Sobibor and
Treblinka (
July 1942 - October 1943).
This was a progressive war of annihilation against the Jews, gradually brought to fruition by a crazed anti-Semitic,
all-powerful persecutor.
The escalation of decision-making in the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" took place in
October 1941.
In
mid September 1941, having previously vacillated over the fate of German Jews,
Hitler ordered
Himmler to carry out their
removal. At a "Final Solution" conference at the
RSHA on
10 October, the decision
was made to deport
Reich Jews eastwards where they would be held in camps.
On
19 October 1941, the Jews of
Frankfurt were
targeted for deportation by the
Gestapo, and three months later, after the Wannsee Conference on
20 January 1942, German and Austrian Jews were dispatched in a wave of deportations to
killing centres in the Soviet Union
(
Minsk,
Riga,
Kovno) and Poland
Lodz,
Chelmno, Sobibor, Treblinka,
Majdanek,
Belzec,
Auschwitz.) sometimes via the
Durchgangsghetto at
Terezin (Theresienstadt) in Czechoslovakia. When
Philip Bouhler and
Viktor Brack
from the Führer’s Chancellery visited
Lublin at the beginning of
September 1941 (within two weeks of the cessation of the
Aktion T4 gassings in the
Reich),
Globocnik spoke to them about his "special task" and referred to the Jews who
were to be deported from the
Reich.
The leading-decision makers in the Nazi hierarchy who argued for total Jewish extermination by gassing were
now coming to the fore. Among the leading advocates in the
Generalgouvernement who were in favour
of gassing were Dr
Wilhelm Dolpheid,
SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr
Ludwig Losacker,
SS-Obersturmbannführer
Helmut Tanzmann, and
SS-Gruppenführer and Governor
Otto Wächter. It is intriguing to note that in
November 1941, Dr
Dolpheid negotiated with
SS-Oberführer
Viktor Brack at the Führer’s Chancellery
in
Berlin for the use of the expertise of T4 personnel to solve the Jewish
Question in his area. If this was the case,
Dolpheid did not know the purpose
of
Belzec, which was already in the course of construction. Clearly, whatever
the decision and whenever it was made, once it had commenced there was no let-up, regardless of whether
the killings were to take place in the execution pits in the Galician forests, or in the
gas chambers at
Belzec.
On
17 July 1941,
Globocnik was appointed
Der
Beauftragte des
Reichsführers-SS für die Errichtung der SS- und Polizeistützpunkte im neuen Ostraum
("Plenipotentiary for the Construction of SS and Police Strongpoints in the new Eastern Area"). Similar
strongpoints were also to be established in Poland, with
Lublin as the
foremost.
Between July 1941 and April 1942, there was a plethora of coded
radio transmissions between
Globocnik and commanders of the
SS- und Polizeistützpunkte
in Riga (
SS-Obersturmführer
Georg Michalsen,
Bialystok/Minsk
(
SS-Untersturmführer Kurt Classen), and
Mogilev (
SS-Hauptsturmführer
Hermann Höfle. Also in the Soviet
Union at this time and closely involved with
Globocnik
were
SS-Obersturmführer Richard Thomalla (later to be overall
supervisor of the construction of
Belzec, Sobibor and
Treblinka) and
SS-Sturmbannführer
Hermann Dolp (in
1940, in general command of the
labour camp complex centred on
Belzec). When
Globocnik was relieved of this construction task on
27 March 1942, with the exception of
Dolp, all of
these officers played important roles in
Aktion Reinhard.
The realisation of the enormous task entrusted to
Globocnik
(and
Christian Wirth), is brought into focus by
Brack
who had directed the euthanasia programme. During his meeting with
Globocnik, Brack
decided that additional personnel from T4 would be placed at
Globocnik’s disposal.
At his trial,
Brack testified:
"
In 1941, I received an oral order to discontinue the
euthanasia programme. I received
this order either from Bouhler or from Dr (Karl)
Brandt. In order to reserve the personnel relieved of these duties and to have the
opportunity of starting a new euthanasia programme after the war, Bouhler requested,
I think after a conference with Himmler, that I send these personnel to
Lublin and
put them at the disposal of SS-Brigadeführer Globocnik. I then had the
impression that these people were to be used in the extensive Jewish labour camps run by
Globocnik (sic!). Later, however, at the end of 1942 or
the beginning of 1943, I
found out that they were used to assist in the mass extermination of the Jews, which was by then already
common knowledge in the higher Party circles."
In fact, on
23 June 1942,
Brack wrote to
Himmler about sending additional T4 personnel for the accelerated operations
due to begin on
1 August, referring to
Globocnik’s
role in this genocide:
"
On the recommendation of Reichsleiter (Philip)
Bouhler, I put my men at Brigadeführer
Globocnik’s disposal for the execution of his special tasks. Having received a
further request from him I sent him more people.
Brigadeführer Globocnik has stated that the campaign against the
Jews should be carried out as quickly as possible, as unforeseen difficulties might stop the campaign
altogether and then we should be stuck in the middle of the road. You yourself, Reichsführer,
some time ago drew my attention to the necessity of finishing this work quickly, if for no other reason
than the necessity to mask it. In view of my own experience I now regard both attitudes, which after all
have one and the same end in view, as all the more justified."
(The letter
in German and
in English)
The very first sentence of this letter confirms that the SS garrison (T4) was in the pay of the
KdF
(the Führer's Chancellery) and in no way connected with the
RSHA.
Brack’s use of the words, "my men" confirms the status of T4 personnel.
What is being seen here then, are the establishing principals and protocols of how Aktion Reinhard would operate
- independently and completely outside of all normal state functions.
Brack
was not simply an extermination planner sitting behind a desk, for he is known to have visited
Lublin at least once. According to
Josef
Oberhauser, Brack’s visit came as a surprise.
Much has been made of a visit to
Lublin and
Belzec
by
Adolf Eichmann but when he made this visit is difficult to determine. According to
the evidence he gave at his trial, his visit was in the
late summer or early autumn of 1941,
2-3 months after the invasion of the Soviet Union. This is questionable, as the construction of
Belzec only commenced on
1 November 1941,
although the survey inspections must have been carried out before then, no later than the
end
of September or early to mid October 1941.
Moreover, the site had to be cleared first by cutting down the trees and the clearing of undergrowth. After that,
only the concrete foundations for the first gas chambers had to be laid; the rest of the barracks – probably
no more than half-a-dozen – were assembled from prefabricated parts. The fact that it took almost two months
to build such a primitive camp was due to the appalling weather conditions – blizzards, fog and temperatures
as low as minus 25ºC that halted work for days on end. The fences and watchtowers were not erected
until after
New Year 1942.
Whatever the date of
Eichmann’s visit the "decision" must have been made well
before construction commenced at
Belzec on
1 November 1941.
Eichmann clearly states that he met
Wirth
("a police captain") at
Belzec and was taken into the camp, where the final
touches to the construction and sealing of the gas chambers were being made. After taking note of the operation,
Eichmann returned to
Berlin where he
submitted his report to his immediate superior,
Heinrich Müller, head of
the
Gestapo, and to
Heydrich.
Wirth
did not take charge of the camp from the SS construction team until
22 December 1941,
and then went away, returning
after
Christmas 1941 to convert one of the barracks into a gas chamber. Any suggestion that
Eichmann was in
Belzec in
autumn 1941 is
problematic. Yet a visit by
Eichmann in
December 1941
is also most unlikely.
In a recent publication,
Christopher Browning has suggested a
possible answer to this enigma. He proposes that
Eichmann’s meeting with
Wirth in fact took place not at the site of the
Belzec camp itself, but at a prototype experimental gassing facility
Wirth had set up in the woods nearby. Sometime after
Eichmann’s visit, perhaps at the meeting of
Himmler, Krüger and
Globocnik on
13 October 1941, it was decided to
construct the camp,
not in an isolated and well hidden location, but rather next to the rail line in order to handle the flow
of transports. There is some persuasive evidence to support this contention.
Eichmann claimed to have seen two small peasant houses in the
midst of a thick forest – terrain quite unlike that where the camp was actually sited.
Josef Oberhauser testified that
Wirth took charge of
Belzec
on
22 December 1941. But
Oberhauser
did not himself arrive in
Belzec until
October or November 1941, and
there is no evidence that precludes
Wirth having been at
Belzec prior to
Oberhauser’s
arrival, then departing, only to return in
December to take charge of the camp. Given
the visit of
Bouhler and
Brack
to the
Generalgouvernement in
September 1941, it is quite conceivable that
a representative
of the euthanasia programme, such as
Wirth,
would have been present during the earliest stages of testing and planning, returning later to take
charge of the camp as it neared completion. Finally, the commander of the Gendarmerie in the
Lublin district,
Ferdinand Hahnzog,
also testified to the existence of a "primitive installation, consisting of a hermetically sealed shack
hidden deep in the forest across from Galicia near
Belzec".
The exact date on which
Eichmann visited
Lublin is immaterial apart, that is, from indicating the connection between
Belzec and the decision-makers in
Berlin.
Any suggestion that
Belzec was one of
Globocnik’s localised cavalier solutions to the Jewish Question can be
dismissed as fanciful. It is clear that
Eichmann’s visit could only have been
either to an experimental site, as outlined above, or during the final phase of the construction,
therefore dating it to probably after the Wannsee Conference on
20
January 1942. But in any winter visit
Eichmann would have
encountered a camp that was virtually complete and quite dissimilar from anything described in his various testimonies.
The "order" therefore, must be calculated from circumstantial evidence. The evidence suggests that in
mid-summer 1941, orders had been issued on a "need to know" basis. More substantial
evidence appears in
late 1941 and early 1942. A corroborative factor and a signpost
may be gleaned from the time when
Globocnik received orders from
Himmler to
implement Aktion Reinhard.
Eichmann, in his evidence at his trial in Jerusalem,
stated that
Heydrich informed him two or three months after the invasion of
Russia that the
Führer had ordered the physical annihilation of the Jews. Later, on a date not determined,
Heydrich ordered
Eichmann:
"
to drive to Globocnik. The Reichsführer has
already given him corresponding orders. Look, see how far he has gone with this project."
We have the highly unreliable autobiographical notes of
Rudolf Höß,
commandant of
Auschwitz, who states that in the
summer of 1941, he received the
order from
Himmler personally, to "
prepare a site for mass
extermination: The existing extermination camps in the East are not in a position to carry out the large
Aktionen which are anticipated. I have therefore earmarked Auschwitz for
this purpose."
Either the dating of this order or its wording are not credible, since there were no extermination camps as such in
1941. In any event, it is
inconceivable that
Globocnik was not made aware of this decision, and it is now
accepted that he was informed verbally by
Himmler during a conference in
Lublin on
20 July 1941.
Oswald Pohl and
Hans Kammler were in
Lublin on the same day.
Globocnik met
Himmler again on
13 October 1941 to discuss proposals limiting "the influence of Jews" against whom it
was necessary to take
steps "of a security police nature". It is conceivable that it was at this meeting that
Globocnik received authorisation to proceed with the construction of
Belzec, where a preliminary survey may have already have been carried out.
Following his return from meetings in Germany in
October 1941,
Hans Frank organised an important series of conferences in the district
capitals of the
Generalgouvernement. At the meeting in
Krakow on
20 October,
Wächter, commented "that an
ultimately radical solution to the 'Jewish Question' is unavoidable."
One point that emerges is that highest SS authorities in conjunction with the
KdF had made "the decision"
but were uncertain as to how it was to be carried out. T4 technology and experience was useful, but the scale
of destruction now proposed required much more technical support. This accounts for
Belzec’s importance as the experimental, prototype death camp.
Once this problem of the mechanism for mass destruction had been solved, there was only the organisation and
implementation of resettlement that remained outstanding. For this, the Wannsee Conference was convened as
the final piece of the jigsaw.
Aktion Reinhard, according to
Globocnik’s own
statements, was to be divided into separate sections dealing with deportations, exploitation of the work
force, utilisation of property and the securing of valuables.
The connection between the T4 euthanasia operation and the ultimate decision to implement the "Final Solution
to the Jewish Question" are inextricably linked. It cannot be simply coincidence that the technology for
the destruction of victims in the gas chambers of the T4 killing centres was available at the optimum moment
for the decision making process, in
mid to late 1941, thereby sealing the fate of
the Jews of Europe. After the "suspension" of T4 in
August 1941 and within the period
suggested above, this "recall" of T4 personnel
is very significant. This sudden reversal was unquestionably the product of policy-making within the
Himmler-
Heydrich-Executive and was
probably the result of several high-level meetings.
In
November 1941, a conference of euthanasia personnel was convened at the euthanasia
killing centre
Sonnenstein where, according to the
Hadamar "gassing physician",
Hans-Bodo Gorgass, "
... the action was not to be ended
as had occurred in August 1941, but it will continue ... in some other form."
It is clear therefore that something was being considered for
the T4 operatives. While many of the T4 personnel were in limbo, decisions were being taken elsewhere.
Exactly what was discussed at these meetings is not clear, but shortly afterwards,
Brack committed T4 personnel to undisclosed duties in the East. By
January 1942, when construction of the
Belzec camp
was nearing completion, the T4 leadership were on the Eastern Front under the camouflage of
Organisation Todt (OT).
The
Himmler-
Heydrich-Executive /
KdF
were now engaged in compiling lists of other T4 personnel for "special duty". One such list, entitled
Sonderführer, was sent to
HSSPF
Krüger in
Krakow. It consisted of an
unknown number of men who were probably to serve alongside the
Ordnungspolizei (Orpo) who were becoming
increasingly more active. Although it is not known where these men were eventually sent, it is possible they went
to
Chelmno to assist the police units gathering there. Another list of 92 T4
staff compiled by
Wirth, Brack, Blankenburg and Prof.
Heyde were designated for special duty in
Lublin. These men were not executives but
the T4 artisans: drivers, builders, guardsmen, clerks and the SS-NCOs and policemen employed in the
Sonderstandesämter of the euthanasia killing centres. Even
Wirth,
and later
Stangl, were at this point intermediary cogs in the machine that
was gathering momentum.
It can be ascertained on the basis of post-war interrogations that the
KdF gathered these men for
the Final Solution programme under
Globocnik’s direction, to form the nucleus
of gassing specialists to staff the first prototype death camp at
Belzec.
To bide their time and keep this specialist unit together, many were sent to the Russian front to aid
wounded German soldiers ("
Aktion Brandt"). Central to this group of medical experts was
Dr
Irmfried Eberl (later commandant at
Treblinka) who set up a medical unit near
Minsk.
Absent was
Wirth, the inspector and trouble-shooter of T4. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that some T4 medical orderlies gave deadly injections to brain-damaged soldiers. There were many
male and female T4 nurses in these units, as well as the SS bus drivers who had been "burners" in the T4 killing
centres. The statement by nurse
Pauline Kneissler, who started her career in
murder at the T4 centre
Grafeneck, that she and her unit administered lethal
injections to brain-damaged, blinded, mutilated troops and amputees, is accepted as fact.
Before the T4 men could finally be put to work, they had to have a killing centre. In this connection,
Bouhler and
Brack met
Globocnik in
Lublin in
September 1941 and
certainly discussed
Aktion Reinhard and the transfer of personnel, then inspected the
Lublin Airfield Camp. On
25 October 1941,
Amtsgerichtsrat Dr
Alfred Wetzel, responsible for Jewish affairs at
the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, wrote to
Heinrich Lohse
(the
Reichskommissar Ostland) with a proposal, advanced by
Brack, to use
Dr
Widmann’s
gas vans in
Riga to kill Jews
unfit for work.
In his so-called "
Gaskammerbrief" ("Gas Chamber Letter"),
Wetzel suggested
the "
Brack remedy" for Jews no longer able to work, while Jews "fit" for labour
might be transported east for further use.
Brack’s suggestions were never
implemented in
Riga as originally planned, but
Aktion Reinhard strategists now
called in his offer to loan T4 personnel for the gassing of Jews in the
Generalgouvernement.
On
14 December 1941,
Brack kept a noon-time
appointment with
Himmler, ostensibly to discuss his recent proposal and perhaps
also to secure or arrange the delegation of T4 personnel to
Lublin.
The first trickle of T4 personnel began to appear for duty at
Belzec in
December 1941.
Schwarz and
Oberhauser were the first
SS-men to arrive in
Belzec at the
end of October 1941.
The rest, 10 men, arrived from the T4 centre
Bernburg at the very beginning of
January 1942. Only a small group
were selected for the initial postings to
Aktion Reinhard. Other T4 personnel returned to their euthanasia
institutions on a temporary basis. In each man’s pay book the red page endorsement read, "not to be employed at the
front line". This was meant to ensure that the no secrets could leak in the event of capture.
Aktion Reinhard
was so secret in formation and extreme in its purpose, that extraordinary measures were adopted. One of the
effects was an arrogant disregard for outside authority by
Aktion Reinhard personnel. They had no reason
to pay any attention to any authority other than the
KdF, via T4, and
SSPF
Globocnik. They were "untouchable" and everyone knew it. This was condoned by
Berlin in that no outside interference was tolerated from any quarter. This being
so, any measure could be either adopted or circumvented in the interests of State secrecy. However, none
of the SS, including the police leadership, could get out of
Aktion Reinhard. An order from the
KdF
forbade any transfer even to front line duties.
Sources:
Edited from an unpublished manuscript by Robin O'Neil.
Browning, Christopher R.
The Origins of the Final Solution, William Heinemann, London, 2004.
Longerich, Peter.
The Unwritten Order – Hitler's Role in The Final Solution, Tempus Publishing Limited, Stroud, 2003.
© ARC 2005